Missiles and Going to War

All of us who have worked with the “bigger” missiles, the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs, cruise missiles (both ground and air launched, the Intermediate Range Ballistic Missiles (IRBM) and some other systems had two primary missions – the first was strategic deterrence.  Our job was to have a nuclear force so powerful that no enemy would ever attack us – we deterred those attacks not only with the forces of Strategic Air Command (SAC), but also with seal launched ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons carried by tactical aircraft that sat alert in Europe and Asia.  All were, and some still are, part of that strong deterrent posture that has kept us out of a large scale war since 1945.  But the second half of that mission was to be prepared, should deterrence fail, to destroy the enemy’s nuclear and conventional forces before they destroy ours – to protect our country and to win a nuclear war.  This past of the online museum will cover two parts of that complex issue – first, how do we ensure our ICBM force, or any force we deploy, will work in wartime?  Second, what is involved at the field level in carry8ing out that mission?

Operational Test and Evaluation

The answer to that first question primarily involves a lot of testing and evaluation.  For a manned system, like a bomber or jet fighter, we get constant feedback on performance, and problems because the aircraft get used – they fly practice missions, they drop bombs and they seldom sit idle.  ICBMs, and other missile systems, on the other hand, are one time use pieces of equipment.  A B-52 can be flown on an exercise bombing mission, bombs dropped and the aircraft can return to its home base.  The crew can be debriefed and the status of the aircraft carefully checked.  For an ICBM, a modified missile can be launched from a modified silo to a target in the Pacific, but the missile is destroyed in the process.

The war planners need data develop war plans – how many of the missiles that we have are on alert and can launch, how many will complete the powered flight phase, how many will deliver the reentry vehicle to the right trajectory, trajectory, how many reentry vehicles will are and detonate, and will they be close enough to the target to inflict adequate damage?    The Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) program was developed to provide data for answers to these questions.  There are similar OT&E programs for aircraft, but missile testing is destructive testing – one test per missile.  To ensure that the testing results represents the operational force, missiles are randomly  selected from alert silos, removed from alert and shipped to Vandenberg AFB, California, for test flights.  The only modifications are those essential for range safety and instrumentation.  The nuclear components are removed from the warhead, packages installed to transmit data about the flight and ordnance installed to destroy the missile if it wanders off course.  The silos at Vandenberg are close to the operational versions, but are modified so they can be used over and over for test launches.   The missies are removed, transported, installed, monitored and launched by operators and maintainers from the unit that provided the missile. 

Until the early 1980s, the OT&E program for each missile type involved 14 to 21 launches per year, a number that gave a high statistical confidence in the test results.  During the late 1970s, there was strong budget pressure to reduce the rate to 3 to 7 missiles per system, with the lower number heavily favored.  A study by the system evaluations found that a test rate of 7 per year per system would give acceptable confidence in the test results. And its applicability to the entire force for that system.  A number of other test programs, including aging and surveillance programs run by various depots, added to the data used to assess the performance of the systems.   

Through the 1980s, SAC was providing planning factors for the Single Integrated Operational Plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) for up to four systems at one time of the five fielded over SAC’s history, Minuteman I, II and III, Titan II and Peacekeeper.   SAC used a small office at the headquarters staffed by hand-picked officers and noncommissioned officers from missile operations and maintenance to assess the reliability and accuracy of these systems, while the U. S. Navy used a contractor to accomplish the task for the seal launched ballistic missiles.  The office, Ballistic Missile Evaluation, prepared a detailed report annually for each system, had it approved by the Commander in Chief SAC, and briefed several levels of the Joint Staff to gain JCS approval.  The JCS then directed the Joint Strategic Targeting and Planning Staff to use the approved planning factors to develop the war plans.  

Emergency War Order Procedures

The war planners develop the war plans, the combat crew carry out those plans.  Missile combat crew train constantly, with the majority of that training concentrating on the part they will most like never use.  Since the primary mission of our nuclear force is deterrence, crews would launch nuclear missiles only if that mission failed.  But they are trained in the classroom and in the simulator, the missile procedures trainer, often, on emergency war order (EWO) procedures.  In the early days of Atlas and Titan, these EWO procedures were relatively simple, since each crew had responsibility for a single missile.  Minuteman came along in 1962, and suddenly, a single combat crew was monitoring 10mmissiles in its primary flight.  It took coordination with the other 4 crews in the squadron to launch the 50 missiles in that squadron, and at least two crews, four people, had to turn keys at the same time, but in the earliest years, the EWO portion of launch was fairly straightforward.  AS Minuteman matured, so did the EWO procedures.  The war planners began developing complex preparatory and execution sequences that some crews thought required a major in mathematics to understand.  The processes have been, and still are, highly classified, but here are the basics in an unclassified summary.  War planners for years theorized that a “bolt out of the blue” attach was most unlikely – that is, an attack on the U. S. without any prior warning or buildup, so this sequence assumes prior warning. 

1 – Crew receives notification of increase in readiness//alert status through one of the communications systems.

2 – Crew may receive further changes in readiness requiring preparatory actions, such removing documents or launch keys from the red safe.

3 – Crew receives the execution message, verifies and validates it with appropriate documents, determines if any targeting actions are required, coordinates with squadron, enters the weapon system launch checklist and proceeds with launch actions.

4 – Crew completes launch actions, makes reports as necessary and prepares for any follow-on messages or actions.